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LDC Lending After the Crisis
In August 1982, Mexico announced that it was
imposing a repayment moratorium on the debt it
owed international banks. Thisanouncement has
had a profound and lasting impact on the mar-
ket's assessment of the risks involved in lending
to less developed countries (LDCs). And although
the debt servicing capabilities of Mexico and
other LDCs have improved significantly since
then, private lenders generally remain cautious
about providing new financing to the developing
countries that are perceived as "troubled." More-
over, bond financing has all but dried up asa
source of funds for these riskier LDCs, forcing
them to rely on private bank loans more heavily
now than they did before August 1982. This
Letter examines these changes in lending pat-
terns and suggests several reasons commercial
banks have been providing virtually all of the
limited supply of new private financing to LDCs
in recent years.
The role of private lending
Prior to the 1970s, external financing of eco-
nomic development in LDCs primarily was pro-
vided by governments of industrial countries and
official multilateral agencies. Private external fi-
nancing was more limited and generally took
one of two forms: direct equity investment in
plant and equipment and international bond fi-
nance. Commercial bank loans, in contrast, were
limited to short-term trade finance.
Beginning in the early 1970s, however, both the
external funds raised by developing countries
and the proportion supplied in private markets
mushroomed. For example, in 1970, less than
half of the $25 billion in external debt outstand-
ingof Latin American countries was provided by
private creditors. By 1982, private creditors held
approximately 70 percent of the $175 billion in
external medium- and long-term debt of Latin
American countries, according to the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD).
Moreover, bank loans, as opposed to bonds, pro-
vided the largest share ofthis private financing.
Of the new private external debt raised by Latin
American debtors between 1977 and 1982, bank
loans accounted for 84 percent and bonds ac-
counted foronly 16 percent. As a result, U.s.
commercial banks' loans outstanding to all LDCs
rose from $81 billion in 1977 to $162 billion in
1982.
Diminished private lending
Mexico's debtmoratorium in August 1982 and
the general LDC repayments crisis thatensued
changed the nature of private lending to LDCs.
(See Letter of May 6, 1988.) Specifically, private
lenders' perceptions of the risks involved in lend-
ing to LDCs changed for the worse and interna-
tional financial markets began to distinguish
more sharply among LDC borrowersaccording to
their creditworthiness, discounting deeply the
outstanding obligations of the most troubled
debtors.
As a result of increased concern for risk, the
supply of new funds for these troubledLDCs
plummeted. According to data published by the
OECD, new.medium- and long-term bank lend-
ing to the 15 troubled LDCs specified in the 1985
Baker Plan fell from $26 billion ayear between
1978 and 1982 to $10 billion after1982. In.terna-
tional bond issuance by these countries fell even
more sharply, from an averageof $4 billion to
$0.2 billion a year over the same period.
Rising reliance on loans
Thus, as the pace of private lending to LDCs
slowed, troubled debtors' reliance on bank loans
increased. As a proportion of total external funds
raised by troubled LDCs, bank loans rose from
84 percent in 1982 to 99.5 percent in 1987. This
is in contrast to the industrial and more credit-
worthy developing countries' growing reliance
on international bond issuance overthis period.
Apparently, as creditworthiness declined,the
troubled countries lost their ability totap the in-
ternational bond market and instead had to rely
relatively more on bank loans for external funds.
In fact, statistical analysis confirms that a coun-
try's reliance on bank lending is negatively re-ERBSF
lated with its creditworthiness and that after 1982
access to bond finance diminished, particularly
for the more troubled borrowers.
There are a number of possible reasons that bank
loans have tended to become more important to
borrowers as credit risk has increased. Three of
these-"involuntary lending;' banks' relative ad-
vantages in loan rescheduling, or workout situa-
tions, and regulatory distortions-are discussed
below.
Involuntary lending
Some have advanced the argument that the in-
creased reliance on bank lending among trou-
bled LDCs is due to involuntary lending; that is,
banks were "forced" to provide additional funds
to protect existing investments. A failure to pro-
vide modest amounts of new funds to cover debt
service requirements would have forced troubled
borrowers into default. In the end, according to
this argument, bankers would have recovered a
much smaller proportion of their original invest-
ment had they chosen not to reschedule out-
standing obligations.
There is considerable evidence to support this
view. Only a small proportion of "new" lending
to LDCs after the crisis represented a net increase
in the amount of borrowed funds available to
those countries. Most of this lending actually
involved maturing obligations that were being
rolled over and/or rescheduled, and in most
cases, the net new funds were sufficient only to
allow the borrower to meet a portion of its out-
standing interest obligations. Moreover, the major
lending syndicates had to enforce "fair-share"
rules to come up with the needed funds. Even so,
lending was considered inadequate, inducing
Treasury Secretary Baker to establish a formal
plan for concerted lending to the fifteen major
troubled debtors.
Thus, the involuntary lending explanation is con-
sistent with the international lending patterns we
have observed for banks. However, it is not en-
tirely satisfactory. A number of troubled LDCs
also had bonds outstanding prior to the crisis.
On the basis of the involuntary lending explana-
tion, the two groups of lenders-the bondholders
and the banks-could be expected to respond
similarly to the debt crisis. Yet the two appear to
have responded quite differently. Nearly all ac-
j
counts of the management ofthe debt crisis sug-
gest that it was the bank lenders and not the
bondholders that were involved in debt resched-
uling and extensions of new credit. As noted ear-
lier, bond financing became nonexistent after the
crisis for certain countries.
Why did the banks respond differently to the
debt crisis than did the bondholders? Assuming
that neither the bankers nor the bondholders
were willing to "throw good money after bad;'
bankers must have had some inducements to
continue lending that bondholders did not have.
Two explanations come to mind. First, bankers
may have had superior information on the ability
of LDC debtors to repay, and/or superior ability
to obtain repayment. Second, bank lenders may
have had regulatory incentives to lend that were
not available to bondholders.
Banks' relative advantage
A number of economists have argued that for cer-
tain types of borrowers bank loans have advan-
tages over bonds as a source of funds. Broadly
speaking, borrowers and investors (tha:tis;tlre ul-
timate lenders) use two types of financial instru-
ments to transfer savings-bonds (direct finance)
and bank loans (intermediated finance). The
choice between the two will depend on the in-
strument that provides borrowers with the cheap-
est source of funds and investors with the highest
return net of the costs of collecting and main-
taining payments records and continuously moni-
toring the borrower's financial condition.
This framework can be applied to international
lending. For some borrowers, particularly the in-
dustrial countries and the developing countries
with no history of balance-of-payments difficul-
ties, the costs of monitoring are relatively modest
since default risk is negligible. Consequently,
these borrowers generally will have ready access
to bond finance.
For other borrowers, particularly those develop-
ing countries with histories of political instability
and sluggish economies, close monitoring may
be necessary because the risk of default is much
higher. These borrowers will find bank loans a
cheaper source of funds because banks typically
haveaccess to information on payments activity
and payments flows that enables banks to moni-
tor and work with troubled debtors, and ulti-mately, to seize assets more cheaply than can
bondholders.
This relative advantage argument helps to
explain why, once the debt crisis erupted and
investors became more concerned about the
probability of default on the part of at least
some of the LDC debtors, there was such a pro-
nounced shift away from bond finance in those
countries: with increased default risk, banks' su-
perior ability to work with troubled debtors
became even more valuable to investors.
Regulatory environment
At the same time, there are a number of factors
specific to banks' regulatory environment that
may have encouraged banks to lend to LDCs
prior to the crisis, and to continue lending to
LDCs after the crisis. One such factor is reserve
requirements. U.s. banks are subject to reserve
requirements on funds they raise abroad and in-
vest domestically. Thus, when U.s. banks were
faced with an influx of foreign deposits from
OPEC countries in the 1970s, they tended to look
abroad for investment opportunities to avoid the
reserve tax on these deposits. The growing de-
mand for external financing among LDCs pro-
vided ready investment opportunities.
Moreover,<underpriceddepQsitinsuran,c:e and
other subsidies (whether implicit or explicit), by
underwriting some of the risk banks undertake,
may have given banks greater incentive (than
bondholders) to lend to LDCs both prior to and
after the crisis. The increases in explicit deposit
insurance coverage from $15,000 in 1968 to
$100,000 in 1980 increased the value of the in-
surance subsidy during this period and added to
banks' incentive to take on risk. Likewise, the
way in which the bank regulators handled sev-
eral major bank failures during this period may
have created a perception that the government
was underwriting a larger proportion of the risks
banks were undertaking.
Given banks' attempts to avoid reserve require-
ments, as well as the inducements to risk-taking
provided by deposit insurance and other subsi-
dies, it is not surprising that a very large share of
the private lending to LDCs even prior to the cri-
sis took the form of ban~)()ansa~opw<?sedto
bonds. After the repaymenfscrisiserupted}ithe
way in which bank regulatory agencies and offi-
cial multilateral agencies such as the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund accommodated the loan
rescheduling and workout process may have re-
inforced the perception that LDC lending was
being subsidized. For example, regulators al-
lowed banks to record most LDC loans at book
value as long as there was a "reasonable" pros-
pect that the bank would be repaid at least its
principal investment. As a result, banks were not
required to record capital losses on LDC loans
even though the market value of those loans de-
clined precipitously following the 1982 crisis. By
allowing this sort of "capital forbearance;' bank
regulators may have provided some inducements
to continue lending.
Complementarity
The availableevidence on lending to LDCs can-
not clearly distinguish among the variousinflu-
ences on bank behavior. It is likelythat the need
to preserve the value of outstanding investments
through involuntary lending, the advantages of
bank loans over bonds in workout situations, and
the existence of regulatory distortions all have
had an impact since they are n,qtr:nutuallyexclu-
sive and may even be complementary.
For example, part of the reason that the govern-
ments of industrial countries may have chosen to
accommodate bank lending to LDCs may have
been that, in the event of a crisis, bank lenders
have a relative advantage in monitoring the bor-
rower and in handling problem loan workouts.
Moreover, multilateral organizations like the IMF
may have encouraged continued lending and
helped enforce fair-share lending rules because
the amounts of funds provided otherwise would
have been inadequate. Thus, the three influences
on bank behavior could have been, and probably
were, mutually reinforcing.
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